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THE USE OF STATE-COMPELLED, SELF-INCRIMINATING
TESTIMONY IN FEDERAL COURT*
By invoking the fifth amendment's protection against compulsory self-incrim-
ination,' a witness whose replies might aid his prosecution for a federal crime
may refuse to answer questions posed by a federal instrumentality.2 Similar
safeguards in state constitutions prevent the states from compelling testimony
which might incriminate witnesses under state law.3 Despite these omnipresent,
similarly oriented provisions, the scope of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion often becomes a matter of serious dispute when the sovereign threatening
prosecution is other than the sovereign making the inquiries.4 In an effort to
*Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958).
1. "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself...." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
2. The constitutional language has been interpreted to protect a defendant or witness
irrespective of the type of proceeding in which the questions are asked. See generally 8
IVIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2252 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE] ; Morgan, The
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REv. 1, 24-45 (1949) ; Annot., 38 A.L.R.
2d 225 (1954) (situations in which fifth amendment is applicable). So long as no criminal
prosecution is threatened, testimony may be compelled even though it exposes the witness
to disgrace, Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896), or to civil liability, 8 WiGmborn §§ 2223,
2254.
3. The state constitutional provisions are collected in 8 WIGMORE § 2252 n.3. In the
only two states which lack such a constitutional guarantee, the privilege has been found
to be part of the common law, State v. Zdanowicz, 69 N.J.L. 619, 55 Atl. 743 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1903), or guaranteed by due process of law, State v. Height, 117 Iowa 650, 91
N.W. 935 (1902).
4. American treatment of this problem has been strongly influenced by an English
case, King of the Two Sicilies v. Wilcox, 1 Sim. (n.s.) 301, 61 Eng. Rep. 116 (Ch. 1851).
There, the King of Sicily brought a bill of discovery in England against agents of a former
revolutionary Sicilian government. They pleaded that their answers would expose them tv
penalties in Sicily. The court held that their silence was not privileged because the court
could not determine, as a matter of law, what was a crime in Sicily, and because no sub-
stantial danger of prosecution by Sicily would arise unless the defendants voluntarily re-
turned to that country. A similar English case was decided a few years later. United States
v. McRae, L.R. 3 Ch. 79 (1867). The United States there sought a bill of accounting
against defendant for money received as an agent of the Confederacy. Defendant pleaded
that his answers would be used against him in proceedings then pending against his prop-
erty in the United States. The court held that the privilege against self-incrimination
protected the defendant from answering, and distinguished King of the Two Sicilies
on the ground that the threat of prosecution in the United States was evident from the
record. Together, the two cases establish the principle that protection against self-incrim-
ination will be granted if the threat of prosecution in a foreign jurisdiction is sufficiently
demonstrated. Bnt see Grant, Federalism and Self-Incrimilnatio-, 5 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1, 5
(1958) (two cases incompatible).
King of the Two Sicilies alone has been widely accepted in the United States, and
is cited as authority for the proposition that one sovereign may disregard the laws of
another in determining the scope of its own privilege against self-incrimination. The lead-
ing case is United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931), in which the fifth amendment
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resolve one facet of this dispute, a leading Supreme Court decision established
that, if a state agency interrogates a witness, the possibility of federal prosecu-
tion will not bring his refusal to testify within the protection of the fifth amend-
ment.9 In that case, the Court also emphasized that the likelihood of federal
prosecution was exceedingly remote, and therefore left unanswered the question
of the amendment's applicability when the danger of such prosecution is sub-
stantial." The recent Supreme Court decision of Knapp v. Schweitzer, how-
ever, now makes the likelihood of federal prosecution an irrelevant issue in a
state proceeding. 7 But Knapp in turn leaves open the extent to which state-
compelled testimony may be excluded from federal prosecutions on grounds of
federal-state collusion."
Petitioner K-napp was a partner in a New York manufacturing firm which
engaged in interstate commerce and employed members of an international
union. Knapp had appeared under subpoena before a New York grand jury
investigating the alleged bribery of union officials, a state offense, and had re-
fused to answer a number of questions. He had argued that his answers might
incriminate him under a federal statute making it a misdemeanor for an em-
ployer to deliver "any ... thing of value to any representative of any of his
employees who are employed in an industry affecting commerce." 9 As a result,
was held not to prevent compulsory self-incrimination under state law in a federal pro-
ceeding. "The English rule of evidence against compulsory self-incrimination, on which
historically that contained in the Fifth Amendment rests, does not protect witnesses
against disclosing offenses in violation of the laws of another country." Id. at 149. Mur-
dock did not discuss why the scope of a 1791 amendment should be made to depend on an
1850 English case, and ignored the earlier American decision of United States v. Saline
Bank, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 100 (1828), which had applied the privilege under similar circum-
stances. See Comment, 41. YALE LJ. 618 (1932).
King of the Two Sicilies seems inapposite for the disposition of cases in the
American federal system. The territorial jurisdictions of the federal and state govern-
ments are coterminous, and a witness may be readily prosecuted by both sovereigns. See
California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 731 (1949) (collecting cases). The existence of a legal
basis for prosecution by the other sovereign is easily ascertained; indeed, federal and state
courts may take judicial notice of each other's laws. 9 WIGMORE § 2573. Accordingly, it
would have been more logical for American courts to follow McRae and hold the privi-
lege applicable whenever the threat of prosecution is substantial.
5. Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S. 372 (1905). For a general treatment of both this prob-
lem and that of federal inquiry with accompanying threat of state prosecution, see 8 WIG-
MORE § 2258 (favoring limitation of the privilege); Grant, Immunity from Compulsory
Self-Incrimination in a Federal System of Government, 9 TEMP. L.Q. 57, 194 (1934-35) ;
Grant, Federalism and Self-Incrimination, 4 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 549 (1957), 5 U.C.L.A.L.
REv. 1 (1958) (arguing against limiting the scope of the privilege); Comment, 41 YALE
L.J. 618 (1932).
6. Jack v. Kansas, supra note 5, at 381-82.
7. 357 U.S. 371 (1958).
8. See id. at 380.
9. Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 302(a), 61 Stat. 157
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 186(a) (1952). Section 302(d) prescribes the penalty for violating
§ 302(a) as a fine of not more than $10,000, imprisonment for up to one year, or both. 61
Stat. 158 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 186(d) (1952).
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the grand jury had utilized state legislation providing immunity from state
prosecution. 10 He had nevertheless persisted in his refusals to testify and, a
New York court having adjudged him in contempt," had appealed on the
theory that the immunity granted could not protect him against federal prose-
cution, and that the testimony sought consequently did not lose its incriminat-
ing character.' 2 Reviewing the contempt decree and finding the fifth amend-
ment inapplicable, the appellate division construed the state constitution as
failing to accord the petitioner a privilege not to reply, because, the court said.
his responses could not prejudice him. The appellate division stated that his
testimony would be excluded from the federal courts on the basis of federal
complicity in obtaining it.13 This complicity was inferred largely from the pub-
lished intention of the local United States attorney to cooperate with the Dis-
trict Attorney of New York County in prosecuting persons accused of bribing
union officials.' 4 Subsequently, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the
10. See 357 U.S. at 372. The relevant immunity provisions are contained in N.Y.
PEN. LAW §§ 381, 2447 (Supp. 1958).
The use of federal immunity statutes to circumvent the prohibition against compulsory
self-incrimination was upheld as constitutional in Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
The grant of immunity is constitutionally sufficient if it prevents prosecution "on account
of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he may testify." Id. at 608. A prior
federal immunity statute had been held constitutionally deficient, possibly because it would
have placed the burden on a defendant to prove the illegal "use" of his testimony. Counsel-
man v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892). State immunity statutes were specifically allowed
in Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S. 372 (1905)- See generally 8 WIGmORE § 2281. nn.9 & 11 (col-
lecting cases and statutes) ; Dixon, The Fifth Amendment and Federal Immunity Statutes,
22 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 447, 554 (1954); Legislation, linniunity for Witnesses Before
Congressional Committees: The Scope of Section 3486, 29 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 153 (1954).
11. People v. Knapp, 4 Misc. 2d 449, 157 N.Y.S.2d 820 (Gen. Sess. 1956). The court
had sentenced Knapp to serve 30 days imprisonment and to pay a $250 fine. Ibid.
12. See Knapp v. Schweitzer, 2 App. Div. 2d 579, 580, 157 N.Y.S.2d 158, 161 (1956).
13. Id. at 582, 157 N.Y.S.2d at 162. Petition for reversal of the contempt conviction
had previously been denied by the New York Supreme Court. See 357 U.S. at 373-74.
The appellate division rejected the view that the state and federal governments were
distinct sovereignties which could ignore each other's laws when determining the scope of
the privilege against self-incrimination. "Federalism as we have developed it does not exist
in airtight compartments of sovereign power; both general and State Governments spread
together over the same land and embrace the same people." 2 App. Div. 2d at 582, 157
N.Y.S.2d at 162. The court attempted to determine the likelihood that the federal govern-
ment would use the testimony sought; and indicated that, except in cases of state-federal
cooperation, no real and substantial danger of prosecution existed. Thus, in the absence
of complicity, the court would allow the testimony to be compelled as not likely to be
incriminating. And if complicity existed, the court assumed that the testimony would be
excluded from use in federal court and that the compelled testimony would therefore not
be incriminating. If incriminating testimony were given, -however, an alert federal attor-
ney might prosecute even if there had been no prior state-federal cooperation. See Feld-
man v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944). Accordingly, the assumption that a threat
of prosecution exists only in cases of complicity seems ill-founded.
14. Petitioner's reply affirmatively pleaded the public announcement and further alleged
that the district attorney "'intends to cooperate with' the United States attorney 'in the
prosecution of such criminal cases in the courts of the United States."' 2 App. Div. 2d at
(Vol. 630:322
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appellate division, but ruled simply that the fifth amendment did not protect
petitioner even though his testimony might be used in federal court.' 5
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the fifth-
amendment issue and held, by a six-to-three majority, that the witness was not
justified in refusing to testify in a state proceeding-whatever the probability
that his testimony would be used against him in a federal prosecution.16 The
fifth amendment was read not as a blanket guarantee that no one may be forced
to incriminate himself under federal law, but merely as a prohibition against
the federal government's compelling self-incriminating testimony.17 The ma-
jority felt that its conclusion was dictated by the nature of the American federal
system, in which law enforcement is primarily a responsibility of the states.' 8
Whenever access to important testimony is barred by possible prosecution
under state law, the Court noted, the state may, at its option, remove the im-
pediment by a grant of immunity ;19 but if the witness is faced with prosecution
by the federal government, the state is powerless to eliminate the threat of
criminal proceedings in order to compel testimony.20 Accordingly, the majority
reasoned, restricting the states' power of inquiry when the threatened prosecu-
tion is federal would constitute a greater impairment of investigatory and law-
enforcement operations than it would when state prosecution is likely.2 1 Were
the Constitution to transform potential federal prosecutions into a source of
581, 157 N.Y.S.2d at 161. Since the issue was the legal sufficiency of the reply, the allega-
tions were accepted as true. Id. at 581, 585, 157 N.Y.S.2d at 161, 165.
15. 2 N.Y.S.2d 975, 142 N.E.2d 649, 162 N.Y.S.2d 613 (1957).
16. 357 U.S. 371.
17. In construing the Fifth Amendment and its privilege against self-incrimination,
one must keep in mind its essential quality as a restraint upon compulsion of testi-
mony by the newly organized Federal Government at which the Bill of Rights was
directed, and not as a general declaration of policy against compelling testimony.
It is plain that the amendment can no more be thought of as restricting action by
the States than as restricting the conduct of private citizens. The sole-although
deeply valuable-purpose of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion is the security of the individual against the exertion of the power of the Federal
Government to compel incriminating testimony with a view to enabling that same
Government to convict a man out of his own mouth.
Id. at 379-80.
The majority opinion, citing Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908), also rejected
the contention that the fifth-amendment privilege against self-incrimination might be ap-
plicable to state proceedings through the "due process" clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. 357 U.S. at 374. Knapp is the first holding on this point, cf. Note, 67 YALEa L.J.
1271, 1279 n.28 (1958), previously thought well established, 8 WjGmoRE § 2252(2); Mc-
ComicK, EvmENcE § 121 (1954).
18. 357 U.S. at 375.
19. Id. at 379.
20. Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S. 372, 380 (1905) ; Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S.
487, 490 (1944). In contrast, the federal government may, under the supremacy clause,
grant immunity against state prosecution. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956);
Brown v. Walker, 161. U.S. 591 (1896).
21. 357 U.S. at 379.
19581
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
protected silence on the part of state witnesses, the Court concluded, the states'
power to investigate crimes would be severely hampered by the expanding
scope of federal criminal legislation.
22
Although the majority opinion finds support in the orthodox, historical view
that the Bill of Rights was enacted not to limit state activities but to assuage
popular apprehension of a too-powerful federal government,23 the majority's
single-minded concern for state law enforcement defeats the underlying policy
which prompted the adoption of both the fifth amendment's self-incrimination
clause and similar state provisions. This underlying policy would subordinate
the law-enforcement function of a sovereign to the privilege of an individual
under legal process not to yield self-incriminating evidence involuntarily.2 1
Since every American jurisdiction follows such a policy, to negate it in order
to avoid the curtailment of law enforcement is to overlook the universal con-
currence that prosecutors should not be allowed to proceed on the basis of in-
formation which the accused unwillingly supplied as the result of compulsion
through legal process. Indeed, four states have decided that their own constitu-
tional privilege against self-incrimination is applicable whenever federal prose-
cution appears possible.2 5 On the other hand, seven states have expressly
limited their constitutional privilege to persons threatened with prosecution by
22. In these days of the extensive sweep of such federal statutes as the income tax
law and the criminal sanctions for their evasions, investigation under state law to
discover corruption and misconduct, generally, in violation of state law could easily
be thwarted if a State were deprived of its power to expose such wrongdoing with
a view to remedial legislation or prosecution.
Id. at 378-79.
23. See id. at 375-77, 378 n.5 (collecting authorities) ; Barron v. Mayor & City Coun-
cil, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 242 (1833) ; Note, 26 GEO. L.J. 439-41 (1938) ; Pittman, The Colonial
and Constitutional History of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in America, 21
VA. L. REv. 763, 789 (1935).
24. The inclusion of the privilege in the federal and state constitutions represents a
decision that, in a democratic society, some efficiency in law enforcement should be sacri-
ficed in order to protect the individual from arbitrary authority. See Brown v. Walker,
161 U.S. 591, 596 (1896) ; Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 495 (1944) (dissenting
opinion) ; United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 571-82, 587 (2d Cir. 1956) (dissent-
ing opinion) ; 8 WIGMORE §§ 2250-51; Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction of the
Self-Incrimination Clause, 29 MicH. L. REv. 1, 191 (1930) ; Morgan, The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINx. L. REV. 1 (1949) ; Pittman, supra note 23. But see
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937) (self-incrimination not offensive to
concept of ordered liberty) ; cf. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) ; Twining v.
New Jersey, 211. U.S. 78 (1908) (compulsory self-incrimination not proscribed by four-
teenth amendment).
25. Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, and Michigan. See, e.g., People v. Den Uyl, 318
Mich. 645, 651, 29 N.W.2d 284, 287 (1947) ("It seems like a travesty on verity to say that
one is not subjected to self-incrimination when compelled to give testimony in a State
judicial proceeding which testimony may forthwith be used against him in a Federal crim-
inal prosecution."). The New York position is ambiguous. See niote 13 supra. See gen-
erally 8 WIGmoRE § 2258 n.3 (collecting cases); Commonwealth v. Rhine, 305 S.W.2d 301
(Ky. 1957), 46 Ky. L.J. 281 (1958).
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the state itself.2 6 In the remaining states, the reach of the privilege remains
undecided.
2 7
A national solution to the problem could be achieved if the Supreme Court,
while allowing a state to grant immunity from local prosecution and to ask
federally incriminating questions, refused to admit the testimony thus obtained
as evidence in federal court. This approach would secure the benefits of the
fifth amendment for all defendants without impairing local law-enforcement
activities. Admittedly, it would also foreclose the use of state-compelled testi-
mony by federal prosecutors, and would create difficulties in determining the
extent to which a given prosecution was dependent on such testimony. In any
event, arguments for and against this solution are academic, because the 1943
Supreme Court decision of Feldman v. United States upheld the proposition
that compelled testimony, if given in a state proceeding without federal com-
plicity, may be utilized in a federal prosecution against the witness.2 8  The
overruling of Feldman is a distinct possibility, however, inasmuch as four
Justices of the present Court have indicated their willingness to reconsider that
decision.29
Since few states construe their constitutions to permit a witness to remain
silent in the face of federal prosecution, Feldman may frequently enable the
Government to evade the privilege against self-incrimination. Seeking to ex-
ploit that decision, federal authorities might prosecute a witness previously
called before state proceedings in which answers were compelled sufficient to
establish his guilt in a subsequent federal trial. The Government might even
have inspired the state interrogation, for cooperation is quite common and
collusion not unknown between federal and state officials.30 Furthermore, the
26. Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, and Vermont.
See 8 WIGIORE § 2258 n.3 (collecting cases).
27. The positions taken by the various states which have considered the matter are
analyzed in Grant, supra note 5.
28. 322 U.S. 487 (1944), 30 CORNELL L.Q. 255, 39 ILL. L. REV. 184, McCoRmic,
EVIDENCE § 124 n.14 (1954).
29. See Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 381 (1958) (concurring opinion of Bren-
nan, J.) ; id. at 382 (dissenting opinion of Warren, C.J.) ; id. at 384-85 (dissenting opinion
of Black, J., joined by Douglas, J.).
On the likelihood of congressional action in this area, see Boudin, The Immunity Bill,
42 GEO. L.J. 497 (1954) ; cf. Brown, Immunity For Witnesses In Congressional Hearings,
1 U.C.L.A.L. Ray. 183 (1954) ; Brownell, Immunity from Prosecution Versus Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 28 TULANE L. RaV. 1 (1953); Federal Legislation, 41 GEo.
L.J. 511-12 (1953).
30. On collusion, see Ward v. United States, 96 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1938) ; Flagg v.
United States, 233 Fed. 481, 483 (2d Cir. 1916).
On cooperation, see Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949) (counterfeiting)
Wilson v. United States, 218 F.2d 754 (10th Cir. 1955) (narcotics) ; United States v. Hor-
ton, 86 F. Supp. 92 (W.D. Mich. 1949) (same) ; Lowrey v. United States, 128 F.2d 477
(8th Cir. 1942) (liquor tax evasion) ; United States v. Irwin, 86 F. Supp. 362 (W.D. Ark.
1949) (same). See also N.Y. Times, May 18, 1956, p. 17, col. 5, quoting letter sent to
1958]
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latter could on their own initiative institute inquiries designed to further fed-
eral prosecutions.3 '
The extent to which a witness can protect himself against successive, com-
plementary, state and federal proceedings depends, in the first instance, on the
construction given certain language in the Knapp and Feldman majority
opinions. Both decisions indicate that collaboration between state and federal
officers in procuring testimony could render it inadmissible in federal court.
32
Knapp further mentions that such collaboration might constitute grounds for
permitting a witness to refuse to testify in a state proceeding, although decision
on this precise question was avoided. 33 A rationale for applying the fifth amend-
ment to govern all state-federal cooperation would be that the "presence" of
federal authority transforms state inquiries into federal ventures subject to the
limitations of the Bill of Rights.3 4 Applying this rationale, a federal court
would exclude all testimony given under state process if the federal govern-
ment was "present" in the state proceedings. Such exclusion would find sup-
port in a series of fourth-amendment cases holding that, when federal officers
participate in a search and seizure not meeting federal standards, the evidence
obtained is inadmissible in federal court even though the search and seizure
Senator Eastland by then Assistant Attorney General Rogers supporting a proposal to
restore to the states the power to punish sedition against the United States:
It is the view of the Department of Justice . . . that in the fields of sedition and
subversion, the Federal and state governments can work together easily and well,
supplementing each other ....
This legislation would clearly express the Congressional intent that such coopera-
tion between the Federal and state governments in this field is to be encouraged.
31. Cf. Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927) ; In re Schuetze, 299 Fed. 827
(W.D.N.Y. 1924); United States v. Falloco, 277 Fed. 75 (W.D. Mo. 1922).
32. If a federal agency were to use a state court as an instrument for compelling dis-
closures for federal purposes, the doctrine of the Byars case, . . . as well as that of
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, afford adequate resources against such an
evasive disregard of the privilege against self-crimination.
Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 494 (1944).
Of course the Federal Government may not take advantage of this recognition of
the States' autonomy in order to evade the Bill of Rights. If a federal officer should
be a party to the compulsion of testimony by state agencies, the protection of the
Fifth Amendment would come into play. Such testimony is barred in a federal prose-
cution, see Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28.
Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 380 (1958).
33. "Whether, in a case of such collaboration between state and federal officers, the
defendant could successfully assert his privilege in the state proceeding, we need not now
decide, for the record before us is barren of evidence that the State was used as an in-
strument of federal prosecution or investigation." Id. at 380.
34. An analogy may be drawn to the situation in which the federal government au-
thorizes state officials to perform federal functions. The state officials are then regarded
as federal officers subject to federal limitations and standards of conduct. See Koenig,
Federal and State Cooperation Under the Constitutio , 36 MIcH. L. REv. 752, 772-75
(1938). See also the theory of agency as developed in the search-and-seizure cases. Note,
3 WAsHa. L. Rv. 189 (1928).
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may have been legal under state law.3 5 On the authority of one of these cases-
Byars v. United States 3 -- the Court has in fact stated in Feldman and Knapp
that the exclusion of evidence should be the sanction imposed on federal officials
whose collusion with state officials threatens to subvert the protection of the
fifth amendment. 37 Neither Feldman nor Knapp, however, ventures to define
the federal "presence" which would place an unconstitutional taint on testimony
elicited in a state proceeding.
If the federal conduct necessary to establish an unlawful "presence" is re-
stricted to the Byars type of activity, the protection afforded by the dicta in
Feldman and Knapp is narrow indeed. The Byars Court excluded evidence
obtained when a federal officer helped conduct a state search and seizure. The
parallel situation under the fifth amendment would be the actual assistance of
a federal officer in the summoning and questioning of a state witness. This un-
likely situation poses few real-life hazards. The difficult and primary prob-
lem arises when testimony is compelled by state officers alone with a view to
its eventual use in federal court.
Although Byars does not precisely cover this problem, other search-and-
seizure cases furnish a basis for an expanded concept of federal-state collusion.
35. Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927) ; Sutherland v. United States, 92 F.2d
305 (4th Cir. 1937) ; Crank v. United States, 61 F.2d 981 (8th Cir. 1932) ; In re Schuetze,
299 Fed. 827 (W.D.N.Y. 1924) ; United States v. Falloco, 277 Fed. 75 (W.D. Mo. 1922).
See CORNELIUS, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §§ 17, 19 (2d ed. 1930).
Judicial supervision of the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts
implies the duty of establishing and maintaining civilized standards of procedure and
evidence. Such standards are not satisfied merely by observance of those minimal
historic safeguards for securing trial by reason which are summarized as "due process
of law" and below which we reach what is really trial by force.
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943). See also Burdeau v. McDowell, 256
U.S. 465, 477 (1921) (dissenting opinion by Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes, J.).
The common-law view was that illegality in obtaining evidence was no ground for ex-
clusion. 8 WIGMORE §§ 2183-84. In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1885), however,
the Court announced that evidence obtained by unlawful methods would be excluded from
federal courts. See also Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Although this
doctrine has been strongly criticized, 8 WIGMORE §§ 2183-84, it is justified as the only
effective sanction available in the search-and-seizure field, Comment, Judicial Control of
Illegal Search and Seizure, 58 YALE L.J. 144 (1948) ; Ely, Federal Constitutional Limita-
lions on Searches by State Authority, 12 ST. Louis L. REv. 159, 164 (1927).
No federal case appears to have excluded testimony in order to effect the privilege
against self-incrimination. State cases have, however. See McCoRsicK, EVIDENCE § 127
n.2 (collecting cases). Boyd and other search-and-seizure decisions reasoned that the
fourth amendment was so closely related to the fifth that the introduction of illegally
obtained evidence would violate the privilege against self-incrimination. A closer analogy
is provided by cases excluding physically or psychologically coerced confessions. E.g.,
Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897) ; MCCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 75, at 155
(1954) ; see In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1947), Note, 56 YAL L. . 1076; 8 WIGMORE
§ 2266; McCoRmic, EVIDENCE § 75 (1954).
36. 273 U.S. 28 (1927).
37. See note 32 supra.
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They hold that a prior agreement or federal instigation constitutes a sufficient
ground for excluding evidence obtained by state officials.38 Were this rule
followed in self-incrimination cases, a working agreement between federal and
state officials, coupled with the federal exploitation of state-compelled testi-
mony, would render that testimony federally inadmissible.
An expanded concept of collusion resting on the search-and-seizure analogy
would be consistent with Knapp and Feldman. True, the Knapp Court ob-
served that the federal prosecuting attorney's announced intention to cooperate
with state officials was "devoid of legal significance." 9 But the facts of that
case virtually required such a conclusion, for Knapp did not produce specific
evidence that the federal government intended to employ his testimony against
him. A federal attempt to use the testimony after a general announcement of
federal-state cooperation would, however, reasonably support the inference that
the compulsion of testimony by the state was undertaken with a view toward
assisting the federal prosecution. The Government could then be allowed to
rebut the inference by demonstrating that no complicity existed in fact. Absent
a convincing rebuttal, the testimony at issue could be excluded as the fruit of
an effort to "take advantage of... the States' autonomy in order to evade the
Bill of Rights." 40 Feldman would not bar this approach, since no evidence was
produced in that case to show that the Government might have cooperated in
the state inquiry which produced the challenged testimony. Indeed, both Feld-
man and Knapp require a liberal approach to inferring collusion from available
evidence, for both decisions assume that ample safeguards exist against federal
attempts to circumvent the fifth amendment through state inquiries. 41 If a
liberal approach is not taken, the Court's collusion doctrine will prove ineffec-
tual on those frequent occasions when defendants are unable to prove subjec-
tive, collusive intent.4
For this reason, an inference of collusion should not depend solely on the
existence of a public announcement like that of the United States attorney in
38. Flagg v. United States, 233 Fed. 481, 483 (2d Cir. 1916) (federal authorities
planned and instigated state action) ; United States v. De Bousi, 32 F.2d 902 (D. Mass.
1929) (instigation) ; In re Schuetze, 299 Fed. 827 (W.D.N.Y. 1924) (federal agent re-
quested state aid) ; United States v. Falloco, 277 Fed. 75, 82 (W.D. Mo. 1922) (conferences
held between state and federal authorities) ; see Comment, Judicial Control of Illegal
Search and Seizure, 58 YALE L.J. 144, 159-60 (1948).
39. 357 U.S. at 380.
40. Ibid.
41. Note 32 supra.
This Court has refused to draw nice distinctions as to when wrongful acquisition
of evidence by state agencies was also a federal enterprise. When a representative
of the United States is a participant in the extortion of evidence or its illicit ac-
quisition, he is charged with exercising the authority of the United States. Evidence
so secured may be regained, Go-Bart Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, and its
admission, after timely motion for its suppression, vitiates a conviction. Byars v.
United States, 273 U.S. 28.
Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 492 (1944).
42. Cf. CORNELIUS, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 18 (2d ed. 1930).
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Knapp.43 Otherwise, unpublicized covert or tacit agreements would be encour-
aged. Prior federal-state understandings should therefore be inferable from a
course of conduct (such as close association in investigation) ,4 4 or from the
repeated federal use of testimony obtained in state proceedings,45 or from com-
munications revealed through the examination of federal and state officials.40
But even if an inference of collusion were drawn and not rebutted, the inad-
missible testimony might still be utilized by federal agents to uncover other
evidence sufficient in itself to establish guilt. Consequently, a meaningful col-
43. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
44. See Ward v. United States, 96 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1938) ; Fowler v. United States,
62 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1932) ; cases cited note 38 supra. See also Lustig v. United States,
338 U.S. 74 (1949), reversing 159 F.2d 798 (3d Cir. 1947).
45. See Lowrey v. United States, 128 F.2d 477 (8th Cir. 1942) (practice of turning
over "big cases" to federal agents) ; Sutherland v. United States, 92 F.2d 305 (4th Cir.
1937) (general agreement that state officers would consult with federal agents to deter-
mine whether the federal government would prosecute concurrent violations of state and
federal law) ; United States v. Irwin, 86 F. Supp. 362 (W.D. Ark. 1949) (same) ; United
States v. Falloco, 277 Fed. 75 (W.D. Mo. 1922) (600-700 cases turned over to federal
authorities in six months). The occasional or sporadic turning over of evidence by state
officers to federal agents is, however, not collusion, United States v. Haywood, 208 F.2d
156 (7th Cir. 1953) ; Parker v. United States, 183 F.2d 268 (9th Cir. 1950), especially in
the absence of recent federal prosecutions based on state-supplied evidence. Kitt v. United
States, 132 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1942) (no understanding on part of federal agents).
46. See, e.g., United States v. Falloco, supra note 45, at 77-81.
Yet another basis exists for excluding evidence obtained by state officials, although its
utility appears limited in self-incrimination cases. A defendant who can show that a search
and seizure was conducted by state officers solely to enforce a federal law can claim the
benefit of the federal judiciary's exclusionary rule, even if no prior state-federal coopera-
tion existed. Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927). An intent to aid federal law
enforcement is presumed from the absence of a legitimate state interest in the evidence
obtained. Ibid.; cf. In re Schuetze, 299 Fed. 827 (W.D.N.Y. 1924). The scope of a proper-
ly authorized inquiry by a state legislative committee is, however, practically unlimited
and not necessarily dependent on its ability to produce legislation. See Wyman v. De-
Gregory, 101 N.H. 171, 137 A.2d 512 (1957) (state legislative inquiry upheld despite
federal preemption of field and federally self-incriminating character of testimony re-
quested). Compare Ehrmann, The Duty of Disclosure in Parliamentary Investigation:
.4 Comparative Study (pts. 1-2), 11 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 117 (1943-1944) ; Landis, Con-
stitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation, 40 HAv. L. Rav. 153
(1926). See also Lilienthal, The Power of Governmental Agencies to Compel Testhniony,
39 HAxv. L. REv. 694 (1926). Thus, rarely will the absence of state interest permit an
inference that a legislative inquiry is designed to aid the federal government. Moreover,
if there were no state interest, a witness could refuse to answer regardless of the possi-
bility of incrimination, since the inquiry would be beyond the power of the state. See
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) ; cf. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S.
178 (1957).
For analogous problems, see United States v. St. Pierre, 132 F.2d 837, 840 (2d Cir.
1942) (dissenting opinion) (grand-jury testimony may be used to discover corroborative
evidence); Grant, Federalism and Self-Incrimination, 4 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 549, 557-62
(1957) (witness in state court proceeding) ; Note, Self-Incrimination by Federal Grand
Jury Witnesses, 67 YALE L.J. 1271 (1958).
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lusion doctrine would bar the federal use of evidence derived from inadmissible
testimony,47 as has been done in wiretapping 48 and search-and-seizure cases.49
At present, the defendant would bear the risk of nonpersuasion when seek-
ing to exclude state-compelled testimony. 0 If he can offer substantial evidence
of collusion, 5' a federal pre-trial hearing may rule such testimony inadmis-
sible.52 If not, he must wait until trial and then attempt to exclude the testi-
mony and the Government's evidence derived therefrom.53 Absent overt com-
plicity, however, his case will often depend on information which is ordinarily
unavailable because necessarily within the exclusive control of the federal and
47. "The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way
is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court, but that it
shall not be used at all." Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251, U.S. 385, 392
(1920) (opinion of the Court per Holmes, J.).
The scope of the privilege against self-incrimination protects against more than mere
subsequent use of the compelled testimony, and extends protection to all incriminating
matters which a witness's answers might reveal. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896) ;
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892). The privilege bars compulsion even if the
answers would form only a link in a chain of evidence. Blau v. United States, 340 U.S.
159 (1950). See also United States v. St. Pierre, 132 F.2d 837, 840 (2d Cir. 1942) (dis-
senting opinion). See generally 8 WIGMORE §§ 2260-61.
48. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939) ; United States v. Costello, 145 F.
Supp. 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
49. United States v. Lipshitz, 132 F. Supp. 519 (E.D.N.Y. 1955); United States v.
Reynolds, 111 F. Supp. 589, 590-91 (D.D.C. 1953) (collecting cases).
50. See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939) (wiretap); Wilson v. United
States, 218 F.2d 754 (10th Cir. 1955) (illegal search and seizure) ; Gilbert v. United
States, 163 F.2d 325 (10th Cir. 1947) (same) ; Lotto v. United States, 157 F.2d 623 (8th
Cir. 1946) (same) ; United States v. One 1948 Cadillac Convertible Coupe, 115 F. Supp.
723, 727 (D.N.J. 1953) (same) (collecting cases).
51. The courts have attempted to prevent pre-trial hearings for the suppression of
evidence from being used as "fishing expeditions" in which, without more than an aver-
ment of suspected illegality, the defense would be entitled to examine the prosecution's
case. United States v. Giglio, 16 F.R.D. 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) ; United States v. Flynn,
103 F. Supp. 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). Judicial resistance to pre-trial hearings is particularly
strong when the prosecution denies that such unlawful means of obtaining evidence have
been employed. E.g., United States v. Giglio, supra; United States v. Frankfeld, 100 F.
Supp. 934 (D. Md. 1951) ; United States v. Pillon, 36 F. Supp. 567 (E.D.N.Y. 1941). See
also United States v. Weinberg, 108 F. Supp. 567 (D.D.C. 1952) ; United States v. Fuji-
moto, 102 F. Supp. 890 (D. Hawaii 1952). For arguments against this policy of keeping
the prosecution's case secret, see Orfield, Discover3, and Inspection in Federal Criminal
Procedure, 59 W. VA. L. REv. 221, 239-41 (1957) ; Comment, 60 YALE L.J. 626, 637-40
(1951).
52. See FED. R. CRim. P. 12(b) (1), (4) ; Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338
(1939).
For separate, pre-trial suits by defendants to suppress evidence, see Lapides v. United
States, 215 F.2d 253, 258 n.4 (2d Cir. 1954) (collecting cases) ; United States v. Klapholz,
230 F.2d 494 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 924 (1956) ; Centracchio v. Garrity, 198
F.2d 382 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 866 (1952). See also note 41 supra.
53. See United States v. Frankfeld, 100 F. Supp. 934, 939 (D. Md. 1951) ; United




state governments. Access to grand jury minutes or lists of government wit-
nesses, for example, is usually denied him.5 4 Thus, he will probably have to
carry his burden of proof by acquiring information through the cross-exami-
nation of government agents and witnesses.",
A particularly formidable task for a defendant would be proving that other
evidence was obtained through the use of inadmissible testimony. In fact, the
efficacy of the collusion doctrine would be seriously impaired if defendants bore
the burden of demonstrating the tainted nature of such derivative evidence.
Recognizing analogous dangers, wiretap and search-and-seizure cases have
held that, once a defendant establishes the original illegal act, the burden of
proof shifts to the Government to show that the rest of its evidence is not
tainted. The Government, in contrast to the defendant, has all the relevant
information within its control; and it can meet its burden by establishing that
it had an independent, legitimate source for the disputed evidence. 57 In view of
54. See Comment, Pre-Trial Disclosure in Criminal Cases, 60 YALE L.J. 626, 629-31
(1951).
In this area, the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are
of little assistance to a defendant. Discovery under rule 16, production of evidence under
rule 17(c), or a bill of particulars under rule 7(f) will not be granted unless the request
is specific as to the information desired, and not exploratory in nature. United States v.
Giglio, supra note 53; United States v. Mesarosh, 13 F.R.D. 180 (W.D. Pa. 1.952). See
also In the Matter of the Application of Russo, 19 F.R.D. 278 (E.D.N.Y. 1956) (deposi-
tion under rule 15(a)) ; United States v. Glessing, 11 F.R.D. 501 (D. Minn. 1951) (same).
See generally Orfield, supra note 51.
Since a pre-trial suit to suppress the evidence is a civil action, Lapides v. United States,
215 F.2d 253 (2d. Cir. 1954), the more liberal pre-trial discovery provisions of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure are then available.
55. See Lowrey v. United States, 128 F.2d 477 (8th Cir. 1942); Ward v. United
States, 96 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1938) ; Crank v. United States, 61 F.2d 981 (8th Cir. 1932) ;
United States v. Irwin, 86 F. Supp. 362 (W.D. Ark. 1949). The dependence on cross-
examination is pronounced when the Government's case is primarily based on the testimony
of its agents. See United States v. Lipshitz, 132 F. Supp. 519 (E.D.N.Y. 1955) ; United
States v. Coplon, 88 F. Supp. 921, 928-30 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 185 F.2d
629 (2d Cir. 1950). See also Lapides v. United States, supra note 54, at 258-59 (dissenting
opinion) ; Note, 61 YALE L.J. 1221, 1223 n.14 (1952).
56. United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 636 (2d Cir. 1950) (wiretap), 60 YALE L.J.
736, 737 n.4 (1951) ; United States v. Goldstein, 120 F.2d 485, 488 (2d Cir. 1941), aff'd,
316 U.S. 114 (1942) (same; affirmed without passing on burden of proof) ; United States
v. Costello, 145 F. Supp. 892, 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (same); United States v. Lipshitz,
supra note 55, at 522-23 (search and seizure).
57. If the Government is able to show that its evidence was derived from an inde-
pendent source, the fact that the illegal source would have given the same information is
disregarded and the evidence is admitted. Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749, 756-57
(D.C. Cir. 1951) ; United States v. Bell, 126 F. Supp. 612, 617 (D.D.C. 1955). "[F]acts
improperly obtained do not 'become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is
gained from an independent source they may be proved like any others ... ."' Nardone v.
United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939), quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
If illegally obtained evidence only confirms information obtained by prior investigation,
the evidence is admissible. Lapides v. United States, 215 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1954) ; United
States v. Goldstein, supra note 56, at 487.
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the relative ease with which the Government can demonstrate the source of its
own evidence, and in order to preserve the vitality of the collusion doctrine,
the wiretap and fourth-amendment precedents should be followed to the effect
that, if a defendant establishes collusion, the Government would then have the
burden of proving the untainted nature of its remaining evidence.68
Unless Feldman is overruled, the amount of protection which the fifth
amendment's self-incrimination clause affords witnesses at state proceedings
will depend on the scope given the Supreme Court's collusion doctrine. Federal
tribunals seeking to provide complete protection could implement the doctrine
by inferring collusion from a course of conduct which suggests federal reliance
on state-compelled testimony. This approach should not hamper state inquiries,
since the fifth-amendment privilege would not become operative until the Gov-
ernment sought to use state testimony. And federal law enforcement would be
impeded only if the Government was unable to prove its case on the basis of
untainted evidence. Serious shortcomings would remain, however, since the
collusion doctrine protects defendants only against federal misconduct in pro-
curing testimony for federal use. Defendants unable to establish collusion, or
to transfer the burden of proof with respect to derivative evidence, might be
punished on the basis of their compelled testimony. Although such punishment
is doubtless "the real evil" which the fifth amendment and similar state pro-
visions were designed to prevent,59 its elimination is not possible under present
law. As the dissenting opinion protested in Feldman, that case stands in the
way of a uniformly effective prohibition against the use of compelled, self-in-
criminating testimony in federal court.60
58. Though the burden may occasionally prove difficult to sustain, the Government has
the power to avoid this predicament by refraining from collusive activity in the first place.
If Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944), were overruled and state-compelled
testimony excluded irrespective of collusion, the burden of qualifying other evidence as
untainted might still be shifted to the government. Then, however, the Government would
be unable to avoid this burden by ceasing prohibited activity.
59. See Feldman v. United States, supra note 58, at 500 (dissenting opinion).
60. Id. at 496-97 (dissenting opinion).
